In the 20th century, the administration of lustration started from the denazification of Germany after World War II by the decision of the Potsdam Conference. Lustration was carried out in the 90s in the states belonging to Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet regime. In other words, lustration is carried out in order to make a switch from an antidemocratic regime to a political system with democratic political order and principles of rule-of-law.
Many of the post-communist states of Eastern Europe have chosen to enact a vetting procedure known as lustration to ban former secret police agents and their informants from holding public office. This practice is part of a global trend toward increasing accountability for human rights violations.
In some countries different laws on Lustration were adopted immediately or soon after the fall of the Eastern Block (Czech Republic – 1991, Baltic States – 1990–1995, Hungary – 1992); in some of them, this was done only after years of transformational change (Poland – 1997, Georgia – 2010, Ukraine – 2014). And in some countries, lustration was not adopted at all, like in the Russian Federation, Central Asian countries, etc. Lustration, the vetting of public officials in Central Europe for links to the communist-era security services, has been pursued most systematically in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Prior attempts to explain the pursuit or avoidance of lustration focused on the differing experiences of communist rule or transition to democracy. A closer examination finds that although the three countries in question had very different histories, there were identical demands for lustration in the early 1990s. These demands were translated into legislation at different times and varied considerably in the range of offices affected and the sanctions imposed.
This article will try to review the lustration policy that was implemented in Georgia and analyze the implications of lustration for democratization and transitional justice.
First of all, the main reasons for lustration according to general principles and practical decisions in various countries similar to Georgia are:
■ To disclose information with regard to secret officers, ones who assisted in the communist regime;
■ Possibility to establish the principle of individual responsibility (mainly political);
■ Removal from holding public posts of employees pertaining to former criminal regime;
■ Initiation of criminal cases and criminal prosecution of persons guilty of mass killings and other crimes against humanity;
■ To reveal and eliminate fascist/totalitarian symbols;
■ Social and information functions.
Secondly, it has to be emphasized that the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe, in its Resolution N1096 (1996) “On Measures to dismantle the heritage of former communist totalitarian systems” dated June, 27, 1996, grants the following:
■ Firstly, guilt, being individual, rather than collective, must be proven in each individual case – this emphasizes the need for an individual, and not collective, application of lustration laws;
■ Secondly, the right of defense, the presumption of innocence until proven guilty, and the right to appeal to a court of law must be guaranteed;
■ Revenge may never be a goal of such measures, nor should political or social misuse of the resulting lustration process be allowed;
■ The aim of lustration is not to punish people presumed guilty (this is the task of prosecutors using criminal law), but to protect the newly emerged democracy.
Georgia is obligated to fulfill the requirements and resolutions of the above resolution within the scope of the Association Agreement between EU and Georgia.
There are two major challenges in terms of lustration in Georgia. First, the lustration process in Georgia started too late, more than 20 years after the fall of the Soviet Union. Second, relevant documents about the staff, officers and former KGB related persons in Georgia are only partially available, making it difficult to find materials needed to ensure that the lustration process is carried out adequately. Unfortunately, the partial destruction of the former state security archive during the Tbilisi War of 1991–1992, as well as the reasonable suspicion that Moscow has taken the appropriate archival materials from Georgia, makes the full-scale lustration difficult. However, the Law of Georgia on Lustration (Law of Georgia Freedom Charter)4 is primarily aimed at dismantling of the totalitarian ideology and the recognition of the Soviet Union as a criminal regime, which is a necessary step towards reevaluating the past and recent history of Georgia.
DESCRIPTION OF THE TRANSITION AND CURRENT STATUS
The transition process varied in different states. The Latvian electoral law from 1992 required from all Parliamentary candidates to issue a written statement on the existence of, or lack of, their ties with the Soviet or other secret services. Since 1995, the law on elections of the Latvian Seym prohibits the election of persons who were active in the Communist Party as well as a range of its partner organizations. Lithuanians created a special parliamentary commission. Finally, in both abovementioned states former employees of foreign (Soviet or other) intelligence services may not stand for parliamentary elections.
In Hungary, according to the 1992 so-called “Zétényi–Takács law”, after fairly lengthy proceedings the Constitutional Court of Hungary arrived at a decision, the essence of which was as follows: the list of agents can be opened to society, if there is public interest in disclosing the past of the agents.
In Poland, when power changed from the communists to the opposition – “Solidarity” – the government guaranteed inviolability to former communists. The newly elected government announced that a “Thick Line” would be drawn between the past and present. But in 1997 the first Law “On Lustration” was adopted in order to check the connection of top executives with the security agencies from the communist period, and a fairly rigid model of lustration procedure has started. Since then, Poland checks all persons entering the civil service in terms of their involvement in the former communist regime in the country. The functions pertaining to such examination are entrusted to the Lustration Office of the Institute of National Memory. The corresponding procedure is applied to everyone starting from the President to the vice-principal of a higher educational establishment.
Georgia was not able to adopt a law on lustration immediately after regaining independence. Although, in late 1980’s, and especially in early 1990’s, being a member of the KGB was a stigma in the society; and being accused of being an “agent of KGB” was the worst kind of insult. Open questions about the KGB and the persecution of its crimes have always stayed only on the level of rhetoric.
On April 9, 1991, after the re-establishment of independence by Georgia, during the short time of peaceful development and failed transition, which was due to the radicalization of political life and open confrontation between the radical opposition and the government of the elected president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the reform of the state security system was forgotten. Moreover, during the escalation of the conflict, the new Georgian Ministry of State Security (based on the Georgian KGB) became a self-isolated and out of control body, refusing to comply with the President’s requests to provide information about secret informers of the KGB and blocking Lustration attempts, which later former high-ranking officials proudly remembered as a sign of professional ethic.
Furthermore, members of the USSR intelligence service took a considerable part of the Archive of the Former Intelligence Committee to Moscow, and most of the remaining Archive was destroyed by a fire during the Tbilisi War. The former KGB’s central building caught fire during the Tbilisi Civil War of 1991–1992. According to the official version from the MIA, as a result of the fire, 210,000 archival files were destroyed – about 80% of the entire collection. The documents that survived were soggy, most of them suffered water damage from the efforts to put out the fire. War and fire affected MIA archives and a large portion of the collection was destroyed as well.
Naturally, one can suppose that the complete content and capacity of these archives will remain unclear and may exceed official approximate numbers. In general, these archives give many reasons for speculation. According to alleged witnesses and participants of the process, some of the important documents from the archive were transferred to the special KGB depository in Smolensk, Russia. A group of Georgian KGB employees escorted the documents, probably in order to sort and then destroy them. Witnesses claim that those were the documents on the line of intelligence developments, accounts and reports.
After all of the failed attempts to initiate a law on lustration since Georgia regained independence in the 90s, public discourse about lustration law was relaunched in early 2000,10 after the country’s westernization process started following the “Rose Revolution” of 2003. Although officially the ruling political party the United National Movement supported the process, the draft law on lustration was presented to the Georgian Parliament on November 30, 2005 by the opposition. According to the draft, those who worked in the former Soviet special services, or held high positions in the Soviet Communist Party, or were serving as KGB agents would be banned from holding key positions in the Government, the President’s Administration, or the Defense and Interior Ministries. The list also included the Chair of the Soviet Georgian Television and Radio Broadcasting Committee.
Those wishing to run for elective office would have to disclose a full record of their past links with the Soviet authorities. Even if a candidate appeared to have collaborated with the ex-Soviet secret services, it would be up to the voters to decide whether to elect them.
But even the authors of the draft law admitted that it would be difficult to enforce this proposal, since documentation about those persons who were KGB agents, or collaborated with the secret services was not available in Georgia.
Although the law was not enacted in the Parliament, lustration became an active topic in political and public discussions. Finally, a tangible lustration started in Georgia in October 2010, when a law on lustration (Freedom Charter) was initiated by Gia Tortladze, a minority MP, and was unanimously supported by the ruling United National Movement party.13 The Georgian Parliament adopted the law – Freedom Charter – in May 31, 2011.The Freedom Charter has three main tenets: strengthening national security, prohibiting Soviet and Fascist ideologies and removing any associated symbols, and creating a special commission to maintain a black-list for anyone suspected of collusion with foreign special forces. The law prohibits persons who were employed within the KGB of the USSR or were at the senior management level in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from holding key positions in the state. The commission on lustration, established in accordance with this law, dealt with the issues of the eradication of communist symbols in Georgia, including the names of streets and squares, as well as the elimination of monuments, symbolizing the totalitarian past.
In 2011, the Parliament of Georgia unanimously adopted a law on lustration, which also forbade totalitarian socialist and Nazi symbols in public places. This law established work-related restrictions for the former employees of the intelligence agencies of the Soviet Union, as well as former public officials of the Communist Party and Komsomol (All-Union Leninist Young Communist League (AULYCL), or Komsomol). These people couldn’t work in executive bodies and in judicial authorities. In addition, the above citizens were unable to hold positions as heads of higher education institutions.
According to Article 9 of the Freedom Charter, positional restrictions apply to those persons, who, from April 25, 1921 until April 9, 1991, served as:
a/ Secret officials of the former Soviet Union’s special services, from the day of Georgia’s declaration of independence (April 9, 1991):
a/ Have refused to cooperate secretly with the special services of independent Georgia;
b/ Were dismissed from the office of secret officials for state security reasons;
c/ Broke off their relations with the special services of independent Georgia for unidentified reasons;
b/ Officers of the former USSR State Security Committee, who, since the day of Georgia’s declaration of independence (April 9, 1991), have refused to continue working with the special services of independent Georgia or who, for state security reasons, were refused work at the special services of independent Georgia;
c/ Members of the Communist Party Central Committees of the former USSR and the Georgian SSR, as well as secretaries of district and city committees;
d/ Members of the former USSR’s and the Georgian SSR’s Lenin Communist Youth Union Central
e/ Committee Bureaus;
f/ Chairman of the Georgian State Committee on Television and Radio Broadcasting. The Freedom Charter restricts persons, listed in Article 9, from being elected or appointed to the following state positions:
a/ “Members of the Georgian government, deputy ministers and ministry department heads, members of the National Security Council, members of Emergency Management Agency, members of Central Election Commission, government members of the Autonomous Republics of Abkhazia and Adjara, general auditor of the State Audit Office and his/ her deputies, director of the National Archives and his/her deputies (Legal Entity of Public Law (LEPL) under the Ministry of Justice), head and deputy heads of the President’s Administration, head and deputy heads of the Government Administration, head of the State Security Service, his/her deputies and department heads, extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassadors, envoys, consuls, president and vicepresident of the Georgian National Bank, representatives of executive authorities in administrative-territorial units (state trustee – governor), members of national regulatory bodies, executive director of LEPL National Statistics Office and his/ her deputies.
b/ Operational unit employees of the territorial bodies of Ministries of Defense and Internal Affairs, and the State Security Service.
c/ Judges of the Constitutional and Common Courts of Georgia.
d/ Rectors of higher education institutions, vice-rectors, deans and department managers; General Director of the Georgian Public Broadcaster, his/her deputies and board members.”
The list is quite long. The legislator tries to cover the entire political and educational field, which could affect the safety of the state and the future generation. This list partly draws from the experience of former socialist countries; however, it can be extended further to cover more unregulated areas, such as the prosecutor’s office, public schools, and so forth. For example, Poland’s lustration law also applies to prosecutors.
At the same time, the Charter guarantees the privacy of those persons who admit that they have secretly cooperated or had covert ties with the former Soviet special services. A similar approach is used in Lithuania, where, according to the lustration law, special service employees, who admit their connection with secret services, will be guaranteed confidentiality, but be prohibited from holding state positions.
The belated adoption of the law was criticized by some scholars: As doctor of law science, Volodimyr Goshovskiy mentions in his article, as of 2010 neither revanche of communist regime nor influence of anti-democratic ideas associated with it constituted a significant threat. Instead, Georgia encountered a problem of direct armed aggression on the part of the Russian Federation. Why there was no focus on the removal from office of individuals who were involved in the promotion of carrying out actions against the territorial integrity and independence of Georgia by intelligent services of aggressor state on the basis of individual punishment and why the interim measures with regard to the removal of persons suspected of such actions were not introduced – is a rhetorical question.
The implementation of the law was criticized by a local NGO, the Institute for Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI). In its article – “Failed Lustration Process in Georgia”, authors underlined why the process had stayed “on paper”.17 In order to realize the law’s objectives, the Charter of Freedom entailed the creation of a special Commission. According to Article 7 of the law, a commission was to be created at the State Security Service of Georgia (which used to be under the Ministry of Internal Affairs at the time of the adoption of the law) that would collect data on people, who secretly collaborated with the special agencies of the Soviet Union, or on people who are believed to have collaborated with the Soviet agencies through information obtained by legal means. The composition of the Commission (except for members proposed by factions represented in the Parliament of Georgia) and its Code of Conduct shall be set out in regulations developed and approved by the head of the State Security Service of Georgia. The Charter promotes the participation of Members of Parliament in the commission. It is not a legally binding provision for Parliament; however, it is clearly noted that MPs (one member per faction) have the opportunity.
Unfortunately, publicly available information suggests that factions in the existing Parliament (elected in 2016) have not used the opportunity to send their representatives to the Commission under the State Security Service. The composition of the Commission was most recently updated on May 25, 2018; new members included high-ranking officials from the State Security Service and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with no mention of MPs as members.
On December 2, 2015, the IDFI contacted the Ministry of Internal Affairs and requested information about the creation of the commission and its activities prescribed by the Charter of Freedom. The IDFI wanted to collect data about the following: how many meetings the commission conducted, whether or not a register was created on secret collaborators and employees of the Soviet intelligence agencies (the ones who voluntarily revealed themselves), and how many people are registered there, etc. The Ministry of Internal Affairs forwarded the request to the State Security Service. On December 30, 2015, the IDFI received a response from the latter institution. According to the letter, the commission, based upon the demands of Charter of Freedom, has only met once on May 28, 2014, and the meeting discussed the mechanisms of creating the register required by the Charter. According to Order N167 (Adopted on February 28, 2014), Article 3, section 1, the commission was obligated to meet at least once every three months. The letter also noted that Order N167 that orders the creation of a commission and defines its provisions was annulled by Order N561 of the same Ministry on July 30, 2015. Therefore, taking into account the fact that the commission was created approximately 3 years after the Charter of Freedom entered into force, this means that the commission only existed for a year and 5 months and convened only once.
According to the Legislative Herald of Georgia, on December 21, 2015, the Head of the State Security Service adopted a new order (Order N115) on the creation of the Commission. On December 30, 2015, a new order was adopted (N122) that set May 1, 2016 as the date of the beginning of the work for the Commission. The regulation of minimal mandatory commission gatherings was also changed; this regulation no longer exists.
In January 2018, the IDFI received information from the State Security Service of Georgia indicating that in 2016–2017, the Commission had considered an unspecified number of appeals to look into candidates for high-level positions regarding their connection with Soviet authorities; the Commission did not find any violations of the law. In addition, in 2016, the Commission asked two entities to stop displaying communist totalitarian symbols, and provided requested information to three entities in 2017.
In order to conduct a real lustration process in Georgia, as it was conducted in other former Socialist countries, the IDFI believes it is necessary to recruit an effective commission, which will be interested in implementing the principles of the Charter of Freedom. As of today, the commission implemented on the basis of the law is not functioning and the State Security Service as well as the Parliament of Georgia cannot ensure the Charter’s translation into practice.
As it was indicated above, one of the main goals of the law is “to provide preventive measures against the principles of communist totalitarian and national socialist (Nazi) ideologies; remove the symbols and names of cult buildings, memorials, monument, bas-reliefs, inscriptions, streets, squares, villages and settlements of the communist totalitarian regime, as well as prohibit the propaganda instruments and other means of communist totalitarian and national socialist (Nazi) ideologies”. Starting from 2013, Stalin monuments were erected in violation of the law in several places in Georgia by local citizens and soon afterwards many of them were vandalized using red paint. Because of numerous similar cases and the division of public opinion towards the personality of Stalin, MPs Levan Berdzenishvili and Tamar Kordzaia initiated amendments. According to MP Berdzenishvili, there were several instances of the restoration of Stalin monuments and the need for such a process to be under the regulation of one particular commission. To make the law more practically effective, in late 2013, the Charter was amended, mainly with the following changes:
1/ Definitions of “Communist Totalitarian Ideology” and “Communist Totalitarian Symbols” were adopted.
2/ The following functions: “to ensure security and democratic development of the country, the secret employees of former USSR special services, registration of officials appointed by this Law, voluntary recognition and registry production, as well as prohibit communist totalitarian and fascist ideologies and propaganda, and other aims defined by the Law” were transferred from the State Security Agency to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 3/ If, after a warning from the state commission, the provision banning the public display of totalitarian symbols is still violated, the action will carry a financial penalty of GEL 1,000.
In practice, there have been several cases in recent years when the State Security Service of Georgia warned both leftist (Noncommercial Legal Entity – Public Union Socialist Georgia) and neo-fascist groups (Georgia’s National Unity) in using totalitarian symbols in public places, there is no information if these organizations were fined according to the law. One thing is certain; the work of the commission is far from effective. The commission assembled only once, and to this day there are streets in Georgia named, not only after Stalin but also, after numerous communist leaders and public figures that is contrary to the law.
The Constitutional Court judges made the correct decision to impose a permanent restriction of holding state positions on certain individuals (listed in Article 9 of the Freedom Charter) without examining their functions and activities during the Soviet regime. A parallel can be drawn with Poland, where after adopting the lustration law people related to Soviet special services were prohibited from public service for a period of 10 years.
Also, it is important to differentiate working with the Communist Party, and cooperation with special services. All former Soviet Socialist Republics or socialist countries impose stricter regulations for those individuals who collaborated with security services. In several countries (e.g. Czech Republic, Poland, etc.) the list of these people is public and available to any interested person.
It is important that the Court did not consider these provisions incompatible with Article 29 and Article 14 of the Constitution. The court exhibited a positive position that restrictions made under the Charter do not lead to discrimination on political grounds, but rather is based on the activities or inactivity of certain individuals during the totalitarian regime, and that the right to hold state positions listed in the Charter cannot be more important that national security.
The Constitutional Court ruling discussed above also contains important recommendations that should be taken into account by Parliament. Specifically, changes should be made to the Freedom Charter so that persons listed in Article 9 are being examined in terms of their past work activities and functions prior to applying the prohibitions. Even though the Constitutional Court declared invalid Article 9, Sub-paragraphs c) and d) of the Freedom Charter, the basis for the decision was the blanket nature of the ban that prohibits members of the Communist Party Central Committees of the former USSR and the Georgian SSR, secretaries of district and city committees, and members of the Lenin Communist Youth Union Central Committee Bureaus from February 25, 1921 until April 9, 1991 to hold state positions listed in Article 8 without individual evaluation. Moreover, the above restriction is permanent. Therefore, if the legislator introduces individual examination of the activities of these people, and makes the restriction temporary (e.g., a 10-year term, as it is in Poland), it will be possible to modify the invalidated norms and reintroduce them in the Freedom Charter. The blanket prohibition can still apply to former employees of Soviet special services that meet the requirements of Article 9 (the plaintiff stated that his low level position was being equated to an employee of special services, which was violating his dignity, since he was trying to distance himself from them), however, other officials should be subjected to individual examinations and the limitation period.
The Freedom Charter includes many other regulations that, for example, aim to combat fascist and Soviet symbols. This issue is extremely important due to the increased frequency of recent attempts to return Soviet monuments (e.g., statues of Stalin). There are many places remaining in Georgia that have streets named after totalitarian leaders (e.g., Stalin Street).
In addition, Article 11 of the Charter provides for the openness of information of those persons, who apply to the election commission to be registered as a candidate. If the election commission determines that the candidate is a person who has collaborated with former Soviet special services, it will address the election administration. If the electoral administration registers the candidate anyway, and the person does not withdraw their candidacy, the commission will publish the secret information about this person. The lustration laws of former socialist countries (for example, Hungary) also apply to persons who wish to hold electoral positions.
The Freedom Charter provides for setting up a Commission inside the State Security Service of Georgia, which also includes members nominated by parliamentary factions. Essentially, the charter implements its regulations through this Commission.
Having a fairly rigid model of lustration procedure can harm the interests of certain citizens and it will overshadow the full process of lustration. The process should be fully harmonized with Resolution 1096 (1996) “On Measures to Dismantle the Heritage of Former Communist Totalitarian Systems” of the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe and its principles.
The biggest challenge facing Georgia is that the former KGB archives are still held by a country that is hostile towards it. It is not proven that these documents will be used as part of a political agenda and against Georgian politicians or public figures, but in the future, there is the risk that the Russian KGB, that according to recent research is a state retaliatory body, can use it for its own political reasons.
In case of Georgia, the following progress was made on the principles of lustration:
■ To disclose information with regard to secret officers, ones who assisted in the communist regime – isn’t/can’t be fulfilled;
■ Possibility to establish the principle of individual responsibility (mainly political) – isn’t/ can’t be fulfilled;
■ Removal from holding public posts of employees pertaining to former criminal regime – isn’t/ can’t be fulfilled;
■ Initiation of criminal cases and criminal prosecution of persons guilty of mass killings and other crimes against humanity – isn’t/ can’t be fulfilled;
■ To reveal and eliminate fascist/totalitarian symbols – is fulfilled;
■ Social and information functions – is fulfilled partially.
The “Thick Line” policy that failed during the early 90’s in Poland will fail in other countries as well because there will always be people who will consider it as a lenient approach towards communist regime and an excuse for state criminals. Despite attempts to “forgive and forget” by the first two Polish governments, the issue of dealing with the communist past did not go away. Even though it was not officially declared, Eduard Shevardnadze’s government (1995–2003) in Georgia was following the same principle and the subsequent government delayed the process for 7 years.
Time is crucial in the process of restoring transitional justice. Delays only show the unwillingness of political actors and strengthen rumors that the process is being deliberately postposed.
The best way is to adopt best practices and success stories. Practical guidelines for the implementation of lustration should be implemented and strict principles should be approved.
In our point of view, the establishment of a proper institute for studying this issue is also very important. Examples include the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes and the Security Service Archives in the Czech Republic and Lustration Office of the Institute of National Memory in Poland.
Widespread access to previously secret documents about secret service agents is the most important point of the lustration process. Even though there was no possibility to adopt a law on lustration and fully examine crimes against citizens in Georgia immediately after regaining independence due to war and the burning of archives, the willingness to declare the Soviet State as a criminal regime is nonetheless crucial for Georgia’s road towards westernization democratic values.
The lustration process in Georgia generally failed and there are objective and subjective reasons: the lack of relevant documents, the delay in time, and the lack of a strong political will. Despite this, the law on lustration is still a very important step forward and a statement the country made in favor of eradicating totalitarian values and the recognition of the Soviet Union as a criminal regime. All of this is clearly necessary to re-evaluate modern history and the recent past.
SOURCES USED AND FURTHER READING
1. Aleksidze, Sandro, “Those, what happened secretly”, in Sakartvelos Respublika N163 (7808), 2. 9. 2015
2. Documentary film “Lost History” [Dakarguli Istoria], 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5vYlBOxhBj4
3. “Amandments Approved at Freedom Charter”, in RFE/RL, 25 December, 2013, https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/25212436.html
4. Avaliani, Givi, “SSS addresses MIA not to allow use of Soviet Symbols in Kakheti”, in NetGazeti, 3 August, 2016, http://netgazeti.ge/ news/132500/
5. “Failed Lustration Process in Georgia”, Institute for Development of Freedom of Information, 25. 1. 2016, https://idfi.ge/en/failed-lustration-in-georgia
6. “Georgia: ‘Architect Of German Lustration’ Discusses Georgian Archive”, in Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 27. 3. 2007, https://www.rferl.org/a/1075535.html
7. Goshovskiy, Volodymyr, “The genesis of lustration in the world and its significance for the development of law-based society”, in Legea Si Viata, January 2017
8. Khutsidze, Nino, “Opposition Pushes Law on Lustration”, in Civil.ge, 1. 10. 2005, https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=11248
9. Kosař, David, “Lustration and Lapse of Time: ‘Dealing with the Past’ in Czech Republic”, Eric Stein Working paper No. 3/2008
10. Law of Georgia No. 1867, 25. 12. 2013
11. Law of Georgia No. 4717, 31. 5. 2017, https://matsne.gov.ge/en/document/view/1381526
12. Maisuradze, Davit, “The Effects of the Constitutional Court Ruling of October 28, 2015 on the Freedom Charter of Georgia”, Institute for Development of Freedom of Information, December 2015
13. Meparishvili, Misha, “SSS warned ‘National Unity’ not to use Fashist Symbols”, in NetGazeti, 18 May, 2018, http://netgazeti.ge/ news/278145/
14. Meparishvili, Misha, “SSS warned ‘Socalist Georgia’ not to use Soviet Symbols on 9th of May”, in NetGazeti, 8 May, 2018, http://netgazeti.ge/news/274696/
15. Moltz, Ryan, “Dealing with communist legacies: the politics of lustration in Eastern Europe”, University of Minnesota Ph.D. dissertation, 2014, https://conservancy.umn.edu/handle/11299/162684
16. Morrison, Thea, “Interior Minister: We Will Act against Fascist Groups”, in Georgia Today, 21. 5. 2018, http://georgiatoday.ge/ news/10348/Interior-Minister%3A-We-Will-Act-against-Fascist-Groups
17. Morrison, Thea, “The Banning of Soviet Symbols in Georgia”, in Georgia Today, 10. 5. 2018, http://georgiatoday.ge/news/10215/ The-Banning-of-Soviet-Symbols-in-Georgia
18. Paichadze, David, “Possibility of Lustration in Georgia”, in RFE/RL, 27. 9. 2012, https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/1523602.html
19. Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe, Resolution N 1096 (1996), “On Measures to dismantle the heritage of former communist totalitarian systems”
20. The Archival Bulletin, N1, 2008
21. Topouria, George, “Georgia’s not so Freedom Charter”, Transparency International Georgia, 12. 7. 2011, http://www.transparency.ge/ en/blog/georgias-not-so-freedom-charter
22. Tsuladze, Zaza, “50 Statuts of Stalin one needs to pay while alive”, in VOA, 11 February, 2013, https://www.amerikiskhma.com/a/ georgia-stalin-vandalism/1600958.html
23. Williams, Kieran, Fowler, Brigid, Szczerbiak, Aleks, “Explaining Lustration in Central Europe: a ‘post-communist politics’ approach”, in Democratization, 2005, 12 (1), https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/248950483_Explaining_lustration_in_Central_Europe_A_'post-communist_politics'_approach
Giorgi Kldiashvili is Historian, Founding Member, and Executive Director of the Institute for Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI), Tbilisi. Professional Archive Researcher working in the history archives of Georgia and abroad.
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